موضوعات
آموزش و پرورش
ادبیات و زبان
پزشکی، دندانپزشکی و داروسازی
تاریخ و جغرافیا
داستان و رمان
دیگر
دین و فلسفه
روانشناسی
ریاضیات و آمار
سلامتی، تناسب اندام و رژیم غذایی
شیمی و پلیمر
علوم اجتماعی و حقوق
علوم زیستی و بیوتکنولوژی
فیزیک و نجوم
کامپیوتر و اینترنت
کتابهای کودکان و داستان
کسب و کار و اقتصاد
کشاورزی و دامپزشکی و غذا
معماری
مهندسی و فناوری
هنر و تئاتر
محصولات
Acts of god - Original PDF
نویسندگان: خلاصه: With the exception of the 9/11 disaster, the top ten most costly catastrophes in U.S. history have all been natural disasters - five of them hurricanes - and all have occurred since 1989. Why this tremendous plague on our homes?In Acts of God, environmental historian Ted Steinberg explains that much of the death and destruction has been well within the realm of human control.
Pain and Emotion in Modern History - Original PDF
نویسندگان: خلاصه: Drawing on the expertise of historical, literary and philosophical scholarship, practicing physicians, and the medical humanities this is a true interdisciplinary collaboration, styled as a history. It explores pain at the intersection of the living, suffering body, and the discursive cultural webs that entangle it in its specific moment.
Empires, Post-Coloniality and Interculturality - Original PDF
نویسندگان: خلاصه: Empires, Post-Coloniality and Interculturality: New Challenges for Comparative Education, presents some outcomes of the 25th Conference of the Comparative Education Society in Europe (CESE), held in Salamanca, in June 2012. The central aim proposed for the debates of the Conference revolves around an intellectual effort to re-think and re-direct the scientific discipline of Comparative Education based on the broad cultural trends that influence the internationalization and/or globalization of education. Reconsidering and/or re-thinking our discipline involves studying the influence exerted on it by three major international forces. First, empires, not so much in terms of discipline or governance but more related to cultural, technological and knowledge perspectives. This area addresses both historical process and contemporary circumstances and is expressed through networks, research programs, academic reform in universities supported by criteria of governance and efficiency, transnational mobility, and linguistic monopolies. Second, it is necessary to re-think the influence of post-colonialism in educational models and models of citizens’ education not only from the perspective of their impact on the curricular reorganization of education systems but also of their educational and sociocultural expression. Both forms were acclaimed both in the 19th century and the 20th century within different international geographic contexts. The third component of the discourse triangle is the reconsideration (not only historical) of the impact of migratory fluxes, or better said, of “cultural migrations”, and their relationship with the reordering of curricular and educational processes in both education systems and in the social framework. Education is now in a transition from “monoculture” to multiple cultures in the classroom. This publication is structured along four themes that illustrate the academic contributions to the Conference. The themes are as follows: I. From Empires, History and Memory: Comparative Studies of Education, II. Learning and Assessment Processes: an International Perspective, III. Transnational Education and Colonial Approach, IV. International Education: Comparative Dimensions.
Entanglements of Modernity, Colonialism and Genocide - Original PDF
نویسندگان: خلاصه: This book offers a novel sociological examination of the historical trajectories of Burundi and Rwanda. It challenges both the Eurocentric assumptions which have underpinned many sociological theorisations of modernity, and the notion that the processes of modernisation move gradually, if precariously, towards more peaceable forms of cohabitation within and between societies. Addressing these themes at critical historical junctures – precolonial, colonial and postcolonial – the book argues that the recent experiences of extremely violent social conflict in Burundi and Rwanda cannot be seen as an ‘object apart’ from the concerns of sociologists, as it is commonly presented. Instead, these experiences are situated within a specific route to and through modernity, one ‘entangled’ with Western modernity. A contribution to an emerging global historical sociology, Entanglements of Modernity, Colonialism and Genocide will appeal to scholars of sociology and social theory with interests in postcolonialism, historical sociology, multiple modernities and genocide.
Thinking in bets making smarter decisions when you don’t have all the facts - PDF
نویسندگان: خلاصه: Professional poker player Annie Duke explores how we can all become better decision-makers in an uncertain and challenging world. She helps us understand how to disentangle the role of luck and skill in determining outcomes, ultimately helping us make better bets that lead to better outcomes and a better life. Get book on Amazon (Must Read) Access My Searchable Collection of 100+ Book Notes Key Takeaways Biases “Resulting”: Our tendency to equate the quality of a decision with the quality of its outcome. The prevents us from accurately assessing the quality of our decisions and the role of luck in the outcomes we achieve. Hindsight bias: Our tendency to see an outcome as inevitable after an outcome is known. It is the enemy of probabilistic thinking that prevents us from seeing the many other outcomes that could have occurred. Loss aversion: Losses hurt more than gains feel good. E.g., winning $100 at blackjack feels as good as losing $50 feels bad. The same applies to being right and wrong. Being wrong hurts more than being right feels good, unless you reframe your relationship with being wrong. Motivated reasoning: The beliefs we hold influence how we process new information. Blind-spot bias: People are better at recognizing biased reasoning in others but are blind to bias in themselves. Binary bias: Our tendency to seek clarity and closure by simplifying complex ideas and situations into two categories. What is thinking in bets? A bet is a decision about an uncertain future. Thus, most of the decisions in your life – switching jobs, choosing a partner, selecting your field of study, not doing something – are bets. They’re choices that you make in the face of an uncertain future. Thinking in bets begins with understanding that there are two forces that influence how our lives turn out: the quality of our decisions and luck. Being able to recognize the difference between these two forces is what thinking in bets is about. Once you can distinguish between the two, you can focus on improving the quality of your decisions, which will help you in the long run. Poker vs chess as a metaphor for life “Life is more like poker. You could make the smartest, most careful decision in firing a company president and still have it blow up in your face. You could run a red light and get through the intersection safely – or follow all the traffic rules and signals and end up in an accident. You could teach someone the rules of poker in five minutes, put them at a table with a world champion player, deal a hand (or several), and the novice could beat the champion. That could never happen in chess.” Life consists of skill, luck, and hidden information. While chess is a highly strategic game, it is unlike life in that it involves very little hidden information or luck. Poker, on the other hand, is a much better model for life. It requires skill, luck, and making decisions in the face of incomplete information. Whereas in chess if you make all of the right decisions, you’re likely to win, in poker, that’s not the case. What’s a good decision? “What makes a decision great is not that it has a great outcome. A great decision is the result of a good process, and that process must include an attempt to accurately represent our own state of knowledge. That state of knowledge, in turn, is some variation of ‘I’m not sure.’” Most of us evaluate the quality of our decisions based on the outcomes we achieve. But you can make a bad decision that turns out favorably and a good decision that turns our poorly. Equating outcomes solely with the quality of your decisions is one way in which we fail to improve our thinking and understand the world. Redefining right and wrong. “If we aren’t wrong just because things didn’t work out, then we aren’t right just because things worked out well.” Being wrong is not a bad thing. It’s an opportunity to learn and grow. It requires humility, an open mind, and a willingness to study our actions. Once you’re comfortable not being “right” or “wrong and living in the shades of gray, you start to learn more from your decisions and the outcomes you experience. This has an added emotional benefits of making the highs less high and the lows less low. Become a calibrator Calibrators use experience and information to more objectively update their beliefs to more accurately represent the world. The more accurate our beliefs, the better the foundation of the bets we make. The better the foundation of the bets we make, the more likely it is that we achieve favorable outcomes in the long run. Default believers “We form beliefs without vetting most of them, and maintain them even after receiving clear, corrective information.” Our default setting is to believe what we hear is true. While we think our processing of information looks like this: We hear something We think about it and vet it, determining whether it is true or false We form our belief It actually looks like this: We hear something We believe it to be true Only sometimes, later, if we have the time or the inclination, we think about it and vet it, determining whether it is, in fact, true or false This default believing behavior means that we hold beliefs that we’ve never actually validated. And because our beliefs shape how we see the world and interpret new information, we hold heavily biased ways of thinking based on beliefs we never tested. This is a dangerous place to be. Fake news amplifies our beliefs Fake news does not convince the other side that the world is one way. It takes people on one side and entrenches their beliefs even further. It plays to the views of our filter bubbles, and in doing so, it amplifies and makes our preexisting beliefs. Being smart makes it worse “It turns out the better you are with numbers, the better you are at spinning those numbers to conform to your beliefs.” Smart people are not more rational thinkers. In fact, they’re more prone to letting biases cloud their vision of the world. Because smart people are better at taking in constructing narratives that support their beliefs, they find more creative ways to rationalize and frame data to fit their preexisting points of view. It’s helps to admit you might be wrong “The more we recognize that we are betting on our beliefs (with our happiness, attention, health, money, time, or some other limited resource), the more we are likely to temper our statements, getting closer to the truth as we acknowledge the risk inherent in what we believe.” When we admit that we aren’t sure of something, we’re more open to updating our beliefs. When we’re more open to update our beliefs, we develop a more accurate view of the world over time. This allows us to improve the quality of our decisions, and in the long run, the outcomes we achieve. Luck vs. skill in outcomes In life we make bets. Those bets lead to outcomes. And ideally, those outcomes teach us something about how we can make better bets. When we analyze outcomes, we ask ourselves: “why did something happen the way it did?” To learn from these inquiries, we have to figure out the role of both luck and skill. Luck is everything that we can’t control – the actions of others, the weather, our genes. Skill is related to how clear our understanding of the world is and the quality of the decision we made based on that understanding. Because of the self-serving bias, we often fail in analyzing outcomes. When something good happens, we attribute it to our skills. We something bad happens, we attribute it to back luck. Basically, we take credit for the good and deflect blame for the bad. “We must believe in luck. For how else can we explain the success of those we don’t like.” – Jean Cocteau The opposite is true when we analyze the outcomes of others. We often attribute their good fortune to luck and their bad fortune to their decisions. These tendencies make us less likely to form an accurate understanding of why things happen in our lives, and so we often learn very little. But if we fight the self-serving bias and learn to better disentangle the role of skill and luck, we can slowly improve our decision over time. Comparing ourselves to others Our happiness is not always related to our objective conditions. In fact, it’s often driven by how we’re doing comparatively to the peer group that we choose. So even when we climb the ladder and improve our circumstances, we often end up unhappy as we continue to see other people doing better than us in certain domains. This comparative frame makes us more likely to be less giving, to be zero-sum thinkers, and to cloud our vision about what drives both our outcomes and the outcomes of others. Why you should improve your decision-making “The cumulative effects of being a little better at decision-making, like compounding interest, can have huge effects in the long run on everything that we do.” Just like how good habits or good investments compound, so do improvements in our decision-making. The earlier you learn to improve your decisions, the better the results. “Improving decision quality is about increasing our changes of good outcomes, not guaranteeing them.” No matter how good your decisions are, you can’t guarantee good outcomes. You can only improve the odds that you get a better outcome. The Rashomon Effect Even when people experience the same event at the same time, if you ask them about it, you will often get two very different accounts about what happened. That’s because the way we interpret the world is not only a function of the objective experience, but includes how we see and choose to understand the world. Overweighting opinions based on feelings “When we have a negative opinion about the person delivering the message, we close our minds to what they are saying and miss a lot of learning opportunities because of it. Likewise, when we have a positive opinion of the messenger, we tend to accept the message without much vetting. Both are bad.” Your relationship with “the messenger” clouds how you see “the message.” If you like them, you see it more favorably. If you don’t like them, you see it less favorably. It’s important to pay attention to this and be honest with yourself to continue being open to good ideas and to not be persuaded by bad ideas. Temporal discounting “The tendency we all have to favor our present-self at the expense of our future-self is called temporal discounting.” When we’re out drinking late at night or thinking about how to invest our money, we tend to overweight our present selves, often at the expense of our future selves. This “present self bias” often leads to pain for us down the road and is mostly avoidable. Don’t watch the ticker “We make a long-term stock investment because we want it to appreciate over years or decades. Yet there we are, watching a downward tick over a few minutes, consumed by imagining the worst. What’s the volume? Is it heavier than usual? Better check the news stories. Better check the message boards to find out what rumors are circulating.” Stop watching the ticker. Don’t get lost in the trees and miss the forest. Sometimes we need to zoom out of the noise of the present to make good decisions about an uncertain future. If you can learn to do this well, you’ll be less anxious about the problems of today and be able to make less emotional decisions. Reactive decision-making is worth avoiding because it often leads us to try to get rid of negative emotions in favor of sustaining positive emotions. This can keep us off track from our longer-term goals. Feelings are path dependent Image you’re playing blackjack in a casino. You start the night with $1,000 and one of two scenarios happens: You lose $900 in the first hour, going on to win it back and end the night even. You win $1,000 in the first hour, going on to lose those gains and end the night even. All of us feel better in the first scenario, despite ending up in the same place. That’s because in the first scenario we end up making our way back from down, and in the second we feel the pain of having been up and not quitting. What’s silly is that both outcomes are the same. The takeaway is that how we feel about something depends heavily on how we got to that outcome. So even when we end up with better outcomes, we can end up feeling worse than if we had worse outcomes. The path of how you got to some outcome matters more than you think. Build Ulysses contracts A Ulysses Contract is when our past-selves prevent our present-selves from doing something stupid. There are two types of Ulysses Contracts: Barrier-inducing: If you want to eat healthy and are meeting a friend at the mall where there is a food court with unhealthy food, you can eat something beforehand or not leave enough time to be able to even visit the food court. You’ve created a barrier (suppressing your hunger or not leaving time) so you can better live by the actions you’ve decided to take. Barrier-reducing: If you want to eat healthy and have a penchant for potato chips, you could choose not to ever have potato chips in the house. That way, when you’re feeling hungry and impulsive late at night, you won’t have them available to you. You could always go to the store, but this requires much more effort, and you’re less likely to do it. Other examples include things like setting automatic contributions to your retirement account. You can meet your investing goals without having to think about timing the market or even making the decision. Scenario planning Scenario planning can help us make better decisions and plans, anticipating how things may or may not work out and improving the quality of our plans along the way. There are two types of scenario planning: Backcasting – If you backcast, you imagine that you’ve achieve your goal. Then you work backward to think about how you got there. This is a positive frame that helps you imagine the outcome you want. Premortems – When you do a premortem, you imagine a world in which you don’t achieve your goal – aka your plan failed. You then think about all of the reasons the plan might fail, and this helps you create a plan that reduces the probability of these things from happening. Both backcasting and premortems are useful, but premortems are more effective in helping you get good outcomes. In imagining a world in which you don’t succeed, you reduce the likelihood that your plans are overly optimistic, help tackle roadblocks in advance, and feel better if you don’t succeed on your path. You won’t win every time “Life, like poker, is one long game, and there are going to be a lot of losses, even after making the best possible bets.” You won’t win or get good outcomes with everything you do. The important thing is to continue to learn, evaluate, and improve over time. But don’t expect to always win, even if you make a great decision.
Adaptive Optics for Vision Science Principles Practices Design and Applications - Original PDF
نویسندگان: خلاصه: The high transverse resolution of retinal imaging systems equipped with adaptive optics provides a unique opportunity to record these eye move- ments with very high accuracy. Putnam et al. showed that it is possible to record the retinal location of a fixation target on discrete trials with an error at least 5 times smaller than the diameter of the smallest foveal cones [63]. We used this capability to measure the standard deviation of fixation positions FIGURE 1.7 Images of the cone mosaics of 10 subjects with normal color vision, obtained with the combined methods of adaptive optics imaging and retinal densi- tometry. The images are false colored so that blue, green, and red are used to repre- sent the S, M, and L cones, respectively. (The true colors of these cones are yellow, purple, and bluish-purple). The mosaics illustrate the enormous variability in L/M cone ratio. The L/M cone ratios are (A) 0.37, (B) 1.11, (C) 1.14, (D) 1.24, (E) 1.77, (F) 1.88, (G) 2.32, (H) 2.36, (I) 2.46, (J) 3.67, (K) 3.90, and (L) 16.54. The proportion of S cones is relatively constant across eyes, ranging from 3.9 to 6.6% of the total population. Images were taken either 1° or 1.25° from the foveal center. For two of the 10 subjects, two different retinal locations are shown. Panels (D) and (E) show images from nasal and temporal retinas, respectively, for one subject; (J) and (K) show images from nasal and temporal retinas for another subject. Images (C), (J), and (K) are from Roorda and Williams [52]. All other images were made by Heidi Hofer. (See insert for a color representation of this figure.) (From Williams and Hofer [57]. Reprinted with permission from The MIT Press.) across discrete fixation trials, obtaining values that ranged from 2.1 to 6.3 arcmin, with an average of 3.4 arcmin, in agreement with previous studies [63, 64]. Interestingly, the mean fixation location on the retina was displaced from the location of highest foveal cone density by an average of about 10 arcmin (as shown in Fig. 1.8), indicating that cone density alone does not drive the location on the retina selected for fixation. This method may have interesting future applications in studies that require the submicron registra- tion of stimuli with respect to the retina or delivering light to retinal features as small as single cells. Whereas the method developed by our group can only record eye position on discrete trials, Scott Stevenson and Austin Roorda have shown that it is possible to extract continuous eye movement records from video-rate images obtained with an adaptive optics scanning laser ophthalmoscope (AOSLO) [66]. Eye movements cause local warping of the image within single video frames as well as translation between frames. The warping and translation information in the images can be used to recover a record of the eye move- ments that is probably as accurate as any method yet devised. This is illus- trated in Figure 1.9, which compares the eye movement record from the AOSLO with that from a Dual Purkinje Eye Tracker. The noise in the AOSLO trace is on the order of a few arc seconds compared to about a minute of arc for the Dual Purkinje Eye Tracker. Note also the greatly reduced overshoot following a saccade in the AOSLO trace. These overshoots are thought to be partly artifacts caused by lens wobble following the saccade and do not reflect the true position of the retinal image. The AOSLO is not susceptible to this artifact because it tracks the retinal position directly rather than relying on reflections from the anterior optics.
Killing Hope_ US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II. Part 1-Zed Books Ltd (2003) - Original PDF
نویسندگان: خلاصه: Introduction A Brief History of the Cold War and Anti-communism Our fear that communism might someday take over most of the world blinds us to the fact that anti- communism already has. —Michael Parenti1 It was in the early days of the fighting in Vietnam that a Vietcong officer said to his American prisoner: "You were our heroes after the War. We read American books and saw American films, and a common phrase in those days was "to be as rich and as wise as an American". What happened?"2 An American might have been asked something similar by a Guatemalan, an Indonesian or a Cuban during the ten years previous, or by a Uruguayan, a Chilean or a Greek in the decade subsequent. The remarkable international goodwill and credibility enjoyed by the United States at the close of the Second World War was dissipated country-by-country, intervention-by-intervention. The opportunity to build the war- ravaged world anew, to lay the foundations for peace, prosperity and justice, collapsed under the awful weight of anti-communism. The weight had been accumulating for some time; indeed, since Day One of the Russian Revolution. By the summer of 1918 some 13,000 American troops could be found in the newly-born Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Two years and thousands of casualties later, the American troops left, having failed in their mission to "strangle at its birth" the Bolshevik state, as Winston Churchill put it.3 The young Churchill was Great Britain's Minister for War and Air during this period. Increasingly, it was he who directed the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Allies (Great Britain, the US, France, Japan and several other nations) on the side of the counter-revolutionary "White Army". Years later, Churchill the historian was to record his views of this singular affair for posterity: Were they [the Allies] at war with Soviet Russia? Certainly not; but they shot Soviet Russians at sight. They stood as invaders on Russian soil. They armed the enemies of the Soviet Government. They blockaded its ports, and sunk its battleships. They earnestly desired and schemed its downfall. But war—shocking! Interference—shame! It was, they repeated, a matter of indifference to them how Russians settled their own internal affairs. They were impartial—Bang!4 What was there about this Bolshevik Revolution that so alarmed the most powerful nations in the world? What drove them to invade a land whose soldiers had recently fought alongside them for over three years and suffered more casualties than any other country on either side of the World War? The Bolsheviks had had the audacity to make a separate peace with Germany in order to take leave of a war they regarded as imperialist and not in any way their war, and to try and rebuild a terribly weary and devastated Russia. But the Bolsheviks had displayed the far greater audacity of overthrowing a capitalist- feudal system and proclaiming the first socialist state in the history of the world. This was uppityness writ incredibly large. This was the crime the Allies had to punish, the virus which had to be eradicated lest it spread to their own people. 6 The invasion did not achieve its immediate purpose, but its consequences were nonetheless profound and persist to the present day. Professor D.F. Fleming, the Vanderbilt University historian of the Cold War, has noted: For the American people the cosmic tragedy of the interventions in Russia does not exist, or it was an unimportant incident long forgotten. But for the Soviet peoples and their leaders the period was a time of endless killing, of looting and rapine, of plague and famine, of measureless suffering for scores of millions— an experience burned into the very soul of a nation, not to be forgotten for many generations, if ever. Also for many years the harsh Soviet regimentations could all be justified by fear that the capitalist powers would be back to finish the job. It is not strange that in his address in New York, September 17, 1959, Premier Khrushchev should remind us of the interventions, "the time you sent your troops to quell the revolution", as he put it.5 In what could be taken as a portent of superpower insensitivity, a 1920 Pentagon report on the intervention reads: "This expedition affords one of the finest examples in history of honorable, unselfish dealings ... under very difficult circumstances to be helpful to a people struggling to achieve a new liberty."6 History does not tell us what a Soviet Union, allowed to develop in a "normal" way of its own choosing, would look like today. We do know, however, the nature of a Soviet Union attacked in its cradle, raised alone in an extremely hostile world, and, when it managed to survive to adulthood, overrun by the Nazi war machine with the blessings of the Western powers. The resulting insecurities and fears have inevitably led to deformities of character not unlike that found in an individual raised in a similar life- threatening manner. We in the West are never allowed to forget the political shortcomings (real and bogus) of the Soviet Union; at the same time we are never reminded of the history which lies behind it. The anti-communist propaganda campaign began even earlier than the military intervention. Before the year 1918 was over, expressions in the vein of "Red Peril", "the Bolshevik assault on civilization", and "menace to world by Reds is seen" had become commonplace in the pages of the New York Times. During February and March 1919, a US Senate Judiciary Subcommittee held heatings before which many "Bolshevik horror stories" were presented. The character of some of the testimony can be gauged by the headline in the usually sedate Times of 12 February 1919: DESCRIBE HORRORS UNDER RED RULE. R.E. SIMONS AND W.W. WELSH TELL SENATORS OF BRUTALITIES OF BOLSHEV1KI— STRIP WOMEN IN STREETS—PEOPLE OF EVERY CLASS EXCEPT THE SCUM SUBJECTED TO VIOLENCE BY MOBS
Basic Techniques of Ophthalmic Surgery (3rd Edition) - Original PDF
نویسندگان: خلاصه: This book is a supplement to the required training and experience that is essential for every ophthalmic surgeon to achieve safe and effective outcomes for patients. Correct surgical site marking and “surgical pause,” or “time out,” are not covered in this book, yet must be consistently and accurately implemented by the ophthalmic surgeon. While perioperative ophthalmic medi cations for each procedure are briefly discussed herein, physicians should be mindful to continually explore specific and proper use of medicaments for each procedure, on which there is an exhaustive body of knowledge, since perioperative pharmacology is also evolving alongside surgical procedures themselves.
The Mercenary Life BY Bills - PDF
نویسندگان: خلاصه: A COST IS ALWAYS PAID… Nikolai Reed is a trader on a Lyran JumpShip plying the space lanes… Chloe Mason is a hot-shot tech with the Hsien Hotheads mercenaries… Leaving the Northwind Highlanders, MechWarrior Ryana Nikol fills a billet with the Eridani Light Horse… Disparate lives, but a unified dream that will bring them all together on a fateful course that will span decades, cover hundreds of light years, and involve love, friendship, and loss across a dozen worlds. Each will pay a price along the way, as a cost always comes due. The Mercenary Life anthology is a compilation of stories written by Randall N. Bills. Including tales from several different characters as they cross paths, and the dream to found a new mercenary command is born. Their unique lives showcase the struggles and trials of the men and women who take up the mercenary mantle from a variety of angles, all bound around that central vision. The first eight stories of this anthology were originally posted for free alongside the release of MechWarrior 5: Mercenaries, acting as the origin stories for the mercenary command within that computer game. This is the first time they have been compiled into a single volume to allow for a Print on Demand physical copy. Additionally, an all-new ninth story has been added—The Sun Will Rise—along with postscripts for every story that gives the reader insight into how stories are crafted within a shared universe between tabletop, computer games, and fiction that spans more than thirty years and tens of millions of words.
آیا کتاب مورد نظر هنوز بر روی سایت قرار نگرفته است؟ جای نگرانی نیست! کافی است بر روی گزینه سفارش کتاب کلیک کرده و درخواست خود را ثبت کنید. در کمتر از چند ساعت کتاب شما را آماده خواهیم کرد.