Destructive Coordination, Anfal and Islamic Political Capitalism A New Reading of Contemporary Iran - Original PDF

دانلود کتاب Destructive Coordination, Anfal and Islamic Political Capitalism A New Reading of Contemporary Iran - Original PDF

Author: Mehrdad Vahabi

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xi The term Anfal in the title of this book is not familiar for the general readership and its meaning cannot be easily understood by referring to English dictionaries. What is Anfal? If you launch an internet search on Anfal, you will encounter two main strands of literature. The first one relates to the Kurdish genocide by Saddam’s regime in the late eighties, and the second is about the eight Surah (chapter) of the Koran known as ‘Al-Anfal’. As Kurdistan regional government has aptly underlined, in Kurdish society, the word Anfal has come to represent the entire genocide over decades. Anfal was the term used by Saddam Hossein to describe a series of eight military campaigns conducted by the Iraqi government against rural Kurdish communities in Iraq, which lasted from February 23 to September 6, 1988.1 The campaign took its name from Surah al-Anfal in the Koran. Al-Anfal literally means the spoils of war (bounties) and was used to describe the military campaign of extermination and looting commanded by Ali Hassan al-Majid, the cousin of Saddam Hossein. As President of Iraq, Saddam Hossein frequently used religious language when describing the actions of his Ba’athist regime (see Johns, 2006), portraying Arabs as true defenders of Islam and Kurds as infidels.2 

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1 CHAPTER 1 Introduction 1.1 Problem Statement Two types of crises should be distinguished: crisis as antinomic to order and as part of a specific order. The former pertains to the crisis as a transi- tory moment from one order to another. This meaning of crisis prevails in conventional economics in which order is generally defined as a state of equilibrium. Accordingly, the crisis is considered to be an exogenous ran- dom shock that moves the system away from its initial state of equilibrium and brings it to a new state of equilibrium. The crisis is then nothing but a transition from one equilibrium (order) to another. The second type of crisis is not exogenous but endogenous to order in the sense that crisis becomes an order insofar as order becomes critical. In this second type, the crisis is not temporary but chronic detaining the property of autopoiesis or self-replication. Using an analogy with the human body, the former type of crisis is akin to infectious diseases and the latter to chronic diseases such as cardiovascular and bipolar disorders. This book is about the type of economic systems that can arise from a critical order and sustain in its turn a critical order. In other words, our main line of inquiry consists of exploring a type of economic system that maintains reciprocal causation with critical order in the sense that while it feeds on critical order, it contributes to its reproduction. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Vahabi, Destructive Coordination, Anfal and Islamic Political Capitalism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17674-6_1 2 A close but different question has already been addressed in the vast literature on political Natural Resource Curse (NRC)1 which asks what type of natural resources can sustain critical orders such as protracted civil wars in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia, Peru, Cambodia, and many other coun- tries? It has been suggested that “lootable goods”, namely goods with a high ratio of value-to-weight that can be exploited by non-qualified labor such as alluvial diamonds, gemstones, and narcotics, can sustain critical orders for a long time (Le Billon, 2001). Accordingly, opium in Afghanistan, alluvial diamonds in many African countries, and narcotics in Latin America are assumed to be the source of durable civil wars or criti- cal orders. In my critical survey of this literature (Vahabi, 2018), I have demon- strated the primacy of institutional rather than a natural curse in explaining the durability of political and military conflicts. The real issue is not what a good or a bad natural resource is; the crux of the matter is what type of economic systems comprising fundamental institutions are compatible with critical orders. Keen (2012) identified the transformation of warfare into “business as usual” as a possible explanation of the durability of civil wars in many countries like Sudan, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Uganda, and Afghanistan. In all these cases, the regime and the rebel were not merely adversaries, but covert allies and partners in preying on natural resources such as diamonds and narcotics, raping women, and racketing the civil population. To put it differently, both contenders were interested in waging war rather than winning the war, since the war was a continuation of economics by other means. Contrary to the NRC, Keen’s analysis focused on political collu- sion between soldiers and rebels and not natural resources. The predatory rule tacitly accepted by belligerents could sustain critical order and deter- mined the use of natural resources.

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1 فصل 1 مقدمه 1.1 بیان مسئله دو نوع بحران را باید متمایز کرد: بحران به عنوان ضد نظم و به عنوان بخشی از نظم خاص. اولی به بحران به عنوان یک لحظه گذرا از نظمی به نظم دیگر مربوط می شود. این معنای بحران در اقتصاد متعارف که در آن نظم به طور کلی به عنوان حالت تعادل تعریف می شود، غالب است. بر این اساس، بحران به عنوان یک شوک تصادفی برون زا در نظر گرفته می شود که سیستم را از حالت تعادل اولیه خود دور می کند و آن را به حالت تعادل جدیدی می رساند. در این صورت بحران چیزی نیست جز انتقال از یک تعادل (نظم) به دیگری. نوع دوم بحران برون زا نیست، بلکه درون زا برای نظم است، به این معنا که تا آنجا که نظم بحرانی می شود، بحران به نظم تبدیل می شود. در این نوع دوم، بحران موقتی نیست، بلکه مزمن است که خاصیت اتوپوئیزیس یا خودتکثیر را حفظ می کند. با استفاده از قیاس با بدن انسان، نوع اول بحران مشابه بیماری های عفونی و دومی به بیماری های مزمن مانند اختلالات قلبی عروقی و دوقطبی است. این کتاب در مورد نوع سیستم های اقتصادی است که می تواند از یک نظم انتقادی ناشی شود و به نوبه خود نظم انتقادی را حفظ کند. به عبارت دیگر، خط اصلی تحقیق ما شامل کاوش نوعی از سیستم اقتصادی است که علیت متقابل را با نظم بحرانی حفظ می کند، به این معنا که در حالی که از نظم انتقادی تغذیه می کند، به بازتولید آن کمک می کند. © نویسنده(ها)، تحت مجوز انحصاری Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Vahabi, Destructive Coordination, Enfal and Islamic Political Capitalism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17674-6_1 2 A سوال نزدیک اما متفاوت قبلاً در ادبیات گسترده در مورد نفرین منابع طبیعی سیاسی (NRC)1 مطرح شده است که می پرسد چه نوع منابع طبیعی می تواند نظم های حیاتی مانند جنگ های داخلی طولانی مدت در آنگولا، جمهوری دموکراتیک کنگو، لیبریا، سیرالئون را حفظ کند. افغانستان، برمه، کلمبیا، پرو، کامبوج، و بسیاری از کشورهای دیگر؟ پیشنهاد شده است که «کالاهای غارت‌پذیر»، یعنی کالاهایی با نسبت ارزش به وزن بالا که می‌توانند توسط نیروی کار غیرمجاز مانند الماس‌های آبرفتی، سنگ‌های قیمتی و مواد مخدر مورد بهره‌برداری قرار گیرند، می‌توانند سفارشات حیاتی را برای مدت طولانی حفظ کنند. لو بیلون، 2001). بر این اساس، تریاک در افغانستان، الماس های آبرفتی در بسیاری از کشورهای آفریقایی، و مواد مخدر در آمریکای لاتین منبع جنگ های داخلی پایدار یا دستورات بحرانی فرض می شود. در بررسی انتقادی خود از این ادبیات (وهابی، 2018)، اولویت نهادی و نه یک نفرین طبیعی را در توضیح دوام درگیری های سیاسی و نظامی نشان داده ام. مسئله واقعی این نیست که یک منبع طبیعی خوب یا بد چیست. نکته اصلی این است که چه نوع سیستم های اقتصادی متشکل از نهادهای بنیادی با نظم های حیاتی سازگار هستند. کین (2012) تبدیل جنگ به "کسب و کار معمول" را به عنوان توضیح احتمالی در مورد دوام جنگ های داخلی در بسیاری از کشورها مانند سودان، سیرالئون، نیجریه، اوگاندا و افغانستان شناسایی کرد. در همه این موارد، رژیم و شورشیان صرفاً دشمن نبودند، بلکه متحدان و شرکای پنهانی در طعمه کردن منابع طبیعی مانند الماس و مواد مخدر، تجاوز به زنان و سرکوب مردم غیرنظامی بودند. به بیان دیگر، هر دو رقیب به دنبال جنگ به جای پیروزی در جنگ بودند، زیرا جنگ ادامه اقتصاد از راه های دیگر بود. برخلاف NRC، تحلیل کین بر تبانی سیاسی بین سربازان و شورشیان متمرکز بود و نه منابع طبیعی. قاعده غارتگرانه که به طور ضمنی توسط متخاصمان پذیرفته می‌شود، می‌تواند نظم حیاتی را حفظ کند و استفاده از منابع طبیعی را تعیین کند.

 

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xvii 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Problem Statement 1 1.2 Primacy of Institutions or Economy: Distribution or Production? 7 1.3 Bringing More Diversity to ‘Diversity of Capitalisms’ 10 1.4 Anfal and Economic Reductionism 12 1.5 Critical Order: Destructive Coordination 14 1.6 Research Method 17 1.7 Background of the Present Book 18 References 19 2 Economic Systems, Modes of Production, and Coordination 23 2.1 Introduction 23 2.2 Endogenous Explanations of Social Order and Crisis 24 2.3 Two Levels of Defining Economic Systems 28 2.4 Market Coordination 34 2.5 Authoritative Coordination 37 2.6 Cooperative Coordination 41 2.7 Destructive Coordination 44 2.8 Political Economy of Coordination 54 2.9 Complementarity and Articulation Problem 56 2.10 Other Related Classifications 59 2.11 Conclusion 64 References 66 contents xviii CONTENTS 3 Conceptualizing Destructive Coordination 73 3.1 Introduction 73 3.2 Theoretical Background 75 3.3 Destructive Coordination in a One-Shot Game: Traffic Circles 77 3.4 Destructive Coordination in a Repeated Game: Prison 81 3.5 Destructive Coordination and Predatory Appropriation 88 3.6 Biopiracy: Res Nullius and Privatization 89 3.7 Destructive Coordination and Disarticulation Problem 95 3.8 Conclusion 98 References 100 4 Political Capitalism, its Varieties, and Islam 105 4.1 Introduction 105 4.2 The Term Capitalism and Diversity of Capitalisms 107 4.3 Weber: Market Versus Political Capitalism 109 4.4 Political Capitalism and Crony Capitalism 112 4.5 General Characteristics of Political Capitalism 113 4.6 Market Capitalism and Great Demarcation 119 4.7 Varieties of Political Capitalism: The North American Case 122 4.8 Varieties of Political Capitalism: The Chinese Case 126 4.9 Varieties of Political Capitalism: The Natural Resource Curse 130 4.10 Islam and Capitalism 133 4.11 Conclusion 138 References 140 5 Anfal and Islamic Economics 145 5.1 Introduction 145 5.2 Anfal in Koran and the Battle of Badr 148 5.3 Contradictory Verses on Anfal 153 5.4 Anfal and the Prophet’s Practices 155 Lands and Properties of Banu al-Nadir 155 Fadak 156 5.5 The Place of Anfal in the Islamic Public Finance 159 5.6 Examples and Definition of Anfal in the Shi’i Islam 165 5.7 Anfal and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 170 Anfal and Article 45 172 Anfal and Article 44 177 xixCONTENTS 5.8 Anfal: The Missing Point in the Economic Literature 182 5.9 Shi’i Islam and Islamic Political Capitalism 186 5.10 Conclusion 189 References 190 6 Anfal in Practice and Islamic Political Capitalism 195 6.1 Introduction 195 6.2 Institutional Complementarity and General Pattern of Anfal’s Progression 198 6.3 Phase 1: Anfal in Khomeini Era (1979–1989) 204 6.4 Holding Structure of BMJ and Islamic Charities 207 6.5 Anfal and Islamic ‘Welfare State’ 209 6.6 Anfal’s Progression in its First Phase and Islamic Banks 216 6.7 Phase 2: Anfal and the Transition Period (1989–2005) 220 6.8 Setad: The Extension of Anfal and Establishment of a New Giant Holding 224 6.9 Anfal’s Progression in its Second Phase and Islamic Banks 230 6.10 Alliance of Anfal and Sepah 235 6.11 Conclusion 245 References 247 7 Privatization Decree: Liberalization or Islamization? 253 7.1 Introduction 253 7.2 Privatization Background Under Rafsanjani and Khatami 256 7.3 Khamenei’s Privatization Decree: Objectives, Process, and Outcomes 264 7.4 Confusing Definitions of Non-state Public Sector 273 7.5 Privatization Decree and the Third Phase of Anfal’s Progression (2006–Now) 278 7.6 Anfal and Authoritative Coordination 284 7.7 Anfal and Market Coordination 286 7.8 Anfal and Cooperative Coordination 292 7.9 Anfal and Destructive Coordination 298 7.10 Conclusion 301 References 303 xx CONTENTS 8 Islamic Political Capitalism and Economics of Predation 309 8.1 Introduction 309 8.2 Economic and Booty Value of an Asset 313 8.3 Oil as a Mixed (Pure) Captive Asset 318 8.4 Complementarity between Predation and Production: The Shah’s Political Capitalism 324 8.5 Predation Versus Production: Islamic Political Capitalism 330 8.6 Capital and Labor Flight as a Typical Economic Behavior 342 8.7 Economics of Hoarding 350 8.8 Anfal and Ecological Disaster 360 8.9 Conclusion 367 References 368 9 Epilogue 375 References 388 References 389 Index 425 xxi Fig. 2.1 Cumulative Causation between Mode of Coordination and Mode of Production 33 Fig. 3.1 Traffic circle game 79 Fig. 3.2 Territorial conflict in prison 85 Fig. 3.3 The probability of aggression and imprisonment 87 Fig. 6.1 A Parallel System of Pension Funds in Post-Revolutionary Iran 213 Fig. 7.1 Value of Iran’s oil exports ($US billion). (X-axis shows the first to eighth years of each president’s term). Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2012 (author’s estimate for the last year of Ahmadinejad’s term) 267 Fig. 7.2 Iranian current account balance ($US billion). (X-axis shows the first to eighth years of each president’s term). Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2012 268 Fig. 7.3 Share of each mechanism in transferring the state assets in terms of 2004 constant price for the period 1990–2000 (%) 272 Fig. 7.4 The value of divested state assets in terms of 2004 constant price for the period 2001–2011 (billion rials) 272 Fig. 7.5 The impossible trinity of Anfal 278 Fig. 7.6 Islamic political capitalism 302 Fig. 8.1 Circuit of economics of hoarding 357 list of figuRes xxiii Table 2.1 Kornai’s models of the capitalist and socialist system 29 Table 2.2 Traditional and modern market coordination 36 Table 2.3 Two different types of authoritative coordination 40 Table 2.4 Two different types of cooperative coordination 43 Table 2.5 Destructive coordination 51 Table 2.6 Economic systems and dominant forms of coordination 52 Table 2.7 A comparison among different modes of coordination and property ownerships 53 Table 5.1 Comparative analysis of liberal market capitalism versus Islamic political capitalism 189 Table 6.1 Number of Islamic loan funds (1979–2014) 216 Table 6.2 First phase of Anfal (1979–1989) 219 Table 6.3 First and second phase of Anfal 244 Table 7.1 Foreign debt, 1989–1993, in billions of US dollars at constant prices 261 Table 7.2 Transfer of property from state to non-state sectors 263 Table 7.3 Different types of privatizations and its beneficiaries 273 Table 7.4 The three phases of Anfal 282 Table 7.5 Political domination of destructive coordination (1979–1989) 299 Table 7.6 Political and economic domination of destructive coordination (1989–2005) 300 Table 7.7 Political and economic domination of destructive coordination (2006–now) 301 Table 8.1 A comparative study of the classical socialist system with the Islamic political capitalism 310 Table 8.2 Types of assets and state space 317 Table 8.3 Quarterly rating of investment security 338 list of tAbles xxiv LIST OF TABLES Table 8.4 Estimation of annual average illicit capital flows for the period 1984–1993 (billion dollars) 350 Table 9.1 Economic processes and institutional primacy 376 Table 9.2 A comparative study of Shi’i political capitalism with classical socialist system and liberal market capitalism 380

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